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Abstract 
This study examines the methods applied for the NPLs management and their 
effectiveness in the European banking sector.  In addition, we investigate the new 
accounting standard- IFRS 9- that its adoption has become mandatory since January 1st 
2018 for all financial institutions, and its impact on the NPLs.  From the assessment of 
the four systemic Greek banks, we find that IFRS 9 has a considerable impact on the 
loan loss provision and consequently their capital adequacy.  It should be mentioned, 
that for some banks the effect of IFRS 9 on capital ratios was more significant and as a 
result they barely managed to reach the minimum requirements.  Finally, through the 
analysis of KPIs for the four Greek systemic banks, we assess the effectiveness of NPLs 
management and the methods that have already been implemented. 
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1. Introduction 
The collapse of Lehman Brother’s and the global financial crisis that followed had a 
tremendous impact on the stability and health of the banking system.  The GFC 
brought forward the weaknesses and risks that European banks were exposed.  The 
supervisory authorities to protect the banking system, issued guidelines, policies and 
adjustments to existing regulatory frameworks in order to achieve a prudential 
framework, enhance supervision, resulting in more resilient banks.  One of the major 
risks and problems that all financial institutions were facing and some still are, is the 
increased volume of non-performing loans, as a result of the excessive lending, risk 
taking and lack of adequate capital and liquidity buffers (Committee on the Global 
Financial System, 2018).  Therefore, it is understandable that proper and effective 
management of non-performing exposures is a key element not only for a bank to 
overcome credit risk issues, but also to help it achieve sustainable development.    
 
The 2007 crisis, despite any improvements in the supervisory framework, once again 
confirmed the importance of credit risk and the need to develop methods of managing 
and dealing with it.  Securitization of assets and default risk swaps contributed to be 
globally spread, which led the weaker banking countries to a difficult position 
(Committee on the Global Financial System, 2018).  When banks are burdened with a 
large number of problem loans in their balance sheet, the criteria for granting new 
loans are tightened which results in the occurrence of the credit crunch phenomenon.  
This phenomenon can have a negative impact on the economy by decreasing 
(suffocating) economic growth as no capital is channeled into the private sector 
(companies), affecting a company’s liquidity which will consequently lead to 
bankruptcy (ECB, 2017, Lamandini et al., 2017).   
 
The supervisory authorities taking into account the importance of proper and timely 
identification and management of NPEs, issued guidelines to tackle this problem.  
Anastasiou (2016), distinguishes the methods to manage NPLs in two major categories; 
the ex-post and ex-ante methods.  In the ex-ante methods, he presents the prudential 
policies and regulations set by the Supervisory Authorities and underlines the 
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importance of more stringent supervision.  In the ex-post methods, the most 
commonly used method, is the transfer of NPLs on an Asset Management Company 
(AMC).  Taking into account the extent of state intervention the methods that can be 
found are the purchasing of a bank’s NPLs by a government agency, the purchasing of 
troubled assets with bonds guaranteed by the government and the State Owned Banks 
(SOB), a mechanism were the government could take over for a while the 
management of problematic banks.  The best solutions for proper NPL management is 
the combination of state intervention through public funds (bailout scheme) and sale 
of troubled assets to AMC (Balgova et al., 2017). 
 
The focus of this study is first to determine the effect of NPLs not only in the banking 
sector but also in a country’s economy.  In addition, we examine the importance in 
implementing the right method to reduce these exposures.  The adoption of common 
reporting standards and guidelines for the proper management of NPEs by supervisory 
authorities aims to harmonise practices among member states and thus succeed in the 
operational goal of mitigating this risk.  Finally, we investigate the NPLs management 
in the four systemic Greek banks and try to assess the result in implementing these 
common practices.        
 
The study is structured as follows. In the first chapter is discussed the empirical 
research that has been conducted in the existent literature.  In the second chapter, 
there is a brief presentation of the definitions and classifications of NPEs according to 
EBA’s guidelines.  Additionally there is a discussion on the determinants affecting NPEs 
formation.  In the third chapter, the methods of NPEs management, either internally or 
externally are discussed.  In the fourth chapter, the new accounting standard (IFRS 9) is 
analysed as well as its impact on a bank’s loan loss provisions and capital adequacy.  
The following chapter, the methodology of this study is outlined while in the sixth 
chapter the results of the study are discussed.  Finally, in the last chapter the 
conclusions of this study are presented.  
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2. Literature Review  
In this section, we present the empirical literature that has been published in the last 
decade.  During our research, we have found papers that approach the problem of 
NPLs from various angles and perspectives.  Non-performing loans is a subject 
frequently studied and investigated in the academic world and as a result we can find 
extensive international literature.  Based on the scope that these papers examine the 
NPLs, we have sorted these into two major categories.  The first one (and the most 
frequent) is the examination of NPLs’ determinants, while the second one refers to the 
effects of NPLs.     
2.1 Determinants of NPLs 
The determinants used in international literature to measure the quality of loan 
portfolios are numerous and can be further sorted into two major categories. The first 
consists of macroeconomic factors, including all indicators reflecting the 
macroeconomic and regulatory environment in which financial institutions operate. 
The second category consists of accounting and microeconomic factors, i.e. figures 
derived from the banks’ financial statements.  One of the most widespread ways of 
measuring the quality of the loan portfolio is the ratio of NPLs.  The weaknesses of the 
banking system appear to be limited not only to the deterioration of the bank's loan 
portfolio, but capital adequacy ratios, liquidity and off-balance sheet items appear to 
have a significant impact on banking crises and pose a threat to overall financial 
stability. 
 
Klein (2013), examines the determinants of NPLs in Central, Eastern and South-Eastern 
Europe (CESEE) for the years 1998-2011.  His findings show that there is a positive 
relationship between NPLs and a country’s key macroeconomic indicators.  Specifically, 
an increase in unemployment and inflation will cause an increase in NPLs.  Apart from 
country specific factors affecting NPLs, his research shows that there are also bank 
specific factors.  An increase in a bank’s profitability will lead to a decrease in NPLs 
while an increase in risk taking will cause an increase in NPLs.  Overall, his paper 
confirms the assumption that sustainable growth and banking system are strongly and 
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positively correlated.  Similarly with Klein, Jakubík and Reininger (2014), investigate the 
determinants of NPLs in CESEE.  It should be mentioned that they differentiate from 
Klein’s aforementioned research paper, by including in their model only 
macroeconomic variables and none of the bank specific variables that Klein uses.  They 
use quarterly data for 9 CESEE countries and they apply GMM in order to eliminate 
possible correlation problems between the independent variables and the error term 
of their model.  The key finding of their research is that economic growth plays a 
pivotal role in the NPL development.  In addition, their research shows that stock index 
also affect NPLs as it is key indicator of economic development. 
 
Beck et al. (2013), estimate the macroeconomic factors that influence NPLs ratios for 
75 countries covering the period 2003 – 2013.  Their findings show that there is a 
strong relationship between NPLs and economic growth, represented in their paper by 
the real GDP growth.  Furthermore, countries with high volume of lending in foreign 
currency and the exchange rate depreciations that face, will affect negatively NPLs.  
Finally, the find that NPLs increase as the stock prices drop.  Later in 2015, Beck et al. 
by applying dynamic panel estimation methods, come to the same conclusions as in 
2013.  Another interesting approach of macroeconomic factors and NPLs is that of Irina 
and Angela (2016).  Their research in 11 CESEE countries, indicates that the most 
important macroeconomic factors affecting a country’s NPLs are the public debt, the 
GDP growth and the unemployment rate.  Their empirical results are strongly 
correlated with the existing literature and confirm the notion that the economic 
growth of a country plays a pivotal role in the health and soundness of its banking 
sector.  The relationship between real GDP growth and the NPL ratios is investigated 
by Mohaddes, Raissi and Weber (2017). They incorporate a dynamic panel-threshold 
model for a sample of Italian banks in 17 regions for the years 1997-2014, and they 
find that by achieving a real GDP growth by 1.2% and above for a number of years, will 
have a significant impact in the reduction of the NPL ratios.    Cerulli et al. (2017), 
identify GDP growth, high interest rates and efficiency in the judicial system as the 
three major macroeconomic determinants of NPLs.  High interest rates have an 
adverse effect on the ability for an individual to pay back the debt which consequently 
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leads to an increase of NPLs.  Finally, it is understandable that lengthy judicial 
procedures can cause a significant increase to an NPL. 
 
There are a lot of academic papers that incorporate in their research a combination of 
bank specific and macroeconomic variables to ascertain the impact on NPLs.  Louzis et 
al. (2012), apply dynamic panel data methods to identify factors affecting NPLs in 
Greek banks.  They differentiate from other similar studies by analyzing the impact on 
consumer loans, mortgages and corporate loans.  Regarding the macroeconomic 
variables, their results show that for all the aforementioned loan categories, these 
variables play an important role.  For corporate loans the most significant 
macroeconomic factor is the real GDP growth rate while for consumer loans is the 
interest rates.  For mortgages the impact of macroeconomic factors is moderate. 
Another important finding is the importance of the adoption by the banks of proper 
risk management methods and regulations.   
 
Cucinelli (2015), examines not only the relationship of credit risk and a bank’s lending 
behaviour but also the difference of the implemented credit policy between 
commercial and cooperative banks.  She analyses data from 488 listed and unlisted 
Italian banks for the period 2007-2013 and incorporates both macroeconomic and 
bank specific variables.  Her research shows that a bank’s lending behaviour is strongly 
correlated with the credit risk of previous years.  An increase of credit risk (i.e. increase 
in NPLs) will reduce the risk tolerance of the bank.  Finally, she finds that there is not 
any indication of different behaviour between commercial and cooperative banks 
during the financial crisis.  In another study of hers in collaboration with Gai, Ielasi and 
Patarnello (2016), investigate the determinants of the Unlikely-to-Pay (UtP) and the 
effect on performing and non-performing loans.  Based on the definitions issued by 
European Banking Authority (EBA), UtP is a criterion for a loan or exposure to be 
recognized as non-performing.  Studying this criterion (UtP) is important as it is 
considered to be a future challenge for the banking system due to the fact that the 
transition from UtP to performing is a key element in the bank’s endeavor to reduce 
NPLs.  They select data (bank specific and macroeconomic) from 73 Italian banks and 
for the period of 2010 – 2016 in order to cover the European debt crisis.  By applying 
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dynamic GMM their results show that sound and proper UtP management is an 
important factor to reduce the UtP ratio and consequently for these loans to be able to 
transition to performing loans. 
 
Anastasiou, Louri and Tsionas (2016), in their study not only investigate the factors 
affecting European banks’ NPLs but also try to discern the effect of NPLs factors in core 
(e.g. Germany, France) and periphery (e.g. Italy, Greece, Portugal) countries.  By 
applying advanced econometric methods such as Fully Modified OLS and Panel 
Cointegrated VAR, they find that the factors affecting NPLs differ among European 
countries and specifically in the core and periphery countries of the euro area.  For 
example, they find that quality of management (assessed in their research with the 
ratio of ROA and ROE), and moral hazard (in their research is examined with the loan 
to deposits ratio) affect significantly NPLs of both core and periphery euro area 
countries while size of a financial institution (examined in their paper with the 
logarithm of total assets) affects more the periphery.  Finally, the periphery is affected 
more by interest rate margins and fiscal consolidation while the core countries are 
affected more by credit to GDP.  In another paper of theirs (2016), by applying GMM 
estimations in a panel dataset of 15 European countries concerning the period of 1990 
– 2015 (quarterly data), they determine the factors affecting NPLs.  From the country 
specific variables, unemployment and growth (as a percentage of GDP), affect strongly 
the increase of NPLs.  The same can be said for the tax on personal income and the 
output gap (variables used for the first time in their study).  Finally, regarding bank 
specific determinants of NPLs, significant impact have the risk preferences and 
management skills. 
 
The significance of regulatory and risk management methods in reducing NPLs 
examine Erdinç and Gurov (2016).  In a panel dataset of banks from Eurozone and 
emerging European countries concerning the period 2000-2011, they apply GMM 
estimation methods in order to investigate the compliance of the Basel Accord, 
Internal Ratings Based approach.  Their research indicates that the application of the 
IRB according to the Basel Accord directives had a significant impact in the reduction of 
NPLs.  In addition, the authors state that the Eurozone countries adopted more the IRB 
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approach than the emerging European countries and therefore the increase of the 
NPLs level was considerable. 
 
The effect of a country’s fiscal policy on its NPLs investigates Siakoulis (2017).  By 
applying panel data statistical methods to a sample of 31 countries for a period of 15 
years, he shows that the austerity measures a government imposes will have a 
negative impact on the NPLs as it will make it more difficult for individuals to pay back 
their loans (household and business loans).  His findings show that the decline of a 
bank’s asset quality can be explained by fiscal and macroeconomic factors. 
 
The relationship between NPLs and corporate governance research Tachouna et al. 
(2017).  They apply GMM dynamic panel data method and principal component 
analysis in order to study the effect of corporate governance to the NPLs of 184 US 
commercial banks during the period 2000 – 2013 (before and after the global financial 
crisis).  Their study shows that small banks apply corporate governance that has a 
positive impact on the reduction of NPLs, while medium and large banks face the 
opposite problem.  This is due to the fact that these banks take more risks in their 
lending policies. 
 
Sztojanov and Guica (2017), investigate the role that foreign currency loans played in 
the financial crisis and the NPLs in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) based on the bank 
ownership.  Their results show that the level of NPLs in state owned banks was more 
heightened than in private owned banks.  Another approach of NPLs and bank 
ownership is that of Us (2018) who estimates the factors affecting NPLs in Turkish 
banks before and after the global financial crisis.  He illustrates that macroeconomic 
and policy related factors have a major impact on NPLs in a post crisis period with the 
fiscal policy to be the most important NPL determinant.  Taking into account the way 
that the Turkish economy operates, the above results are completely understandable.  
For the bank specific variables, Us states that the significance of these variables 
depends on the ownership of the bank.   
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2.2 Effect of NPLs 
Accornero et al. (2017) study the effect of non-performing loans on a bank’s credit 
supply to non-financial Italians firms concerning the period 2008 – 2015.  The dataset 
that they use is unique as it combines not only data from the Italian banks but also 
data from 2.5 million borrowers (derived from the Italian Credit Register).  Their 
research shows that there is a negative relationship between NPLs and bank credit 
supply.  From the bank specific variables perspective, changes in capital ratios affect 
credit supply.  Finally, the authors advise that forced liquidation of NPLs may have 
adverse consequences to banks in case of losses because it will force the banks to 
reduce their capital ratios.   
 
Another interesting perspective in the existing academic literature is the impact of the 
NPLs on a bank’s profitability.  Louzis and Vouldis (2015), examine the drivers of 
profitability in Greek banks by implementing dynamic panel data methods in a sample 
of all Greek commercial banks for the years 2004 – 2011.  Their findings indicate that 
there is a substitute relationship between interest and non-interest income with the 
non-interest income to be adopted by efficient banks as a mean to increase revenues 
rather than start an “interest war” with the competition.  Finally, Bhaarathi (2018) 
investigates 93 Indian banks regarding the relationship of asset quality and 
profitability.  His results shows that there is a negative correlation between NPLs and 
profitability.  An increase in NPLs will cause in a decrease of asset quality which will 
also cause a decrease in ROE and ROA (measures of profitability).  
 
The research papers in the international and domestic literature dealing with the 
problem of NPLs are quite numerous.  In fact, it is one of the most frequently discussed 
issues in the world in the last decade.  Almost all of the papers we presented, examine 
the causal relationship between macroeconomic and bank specific figures with NPLs.  
There are also many other papers dealing with this particular issue, but they are very 
much covered by the ones mentioned above.   
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3. Non – Performing Loans (NPLs) – An overview 
This chapter will introduce basic terms and concept regarding NPLs, the determinants 
that affect these loans and the impact not only on a bank’s performance but also to 
the economy.  Finally, there is going to be a brief presentation of the above mentioned 
problem of troubled assets (NPLs) in the European Union (EU). 
3.1 Definition and classification of NPLs 
One of the main tasks of a bank is to provide loans to companies which will help them 
expand by investing these funds and consequently create jobs.  From these 
transactions, a bank makes money by charging an interest.  The GFC has led a lot of 
individuals (companies and households) to financial difficulties which affected their 
ability to keep up with their loan agreements.  It should be mentioned that non-
repayment of debt obligations has detrimental effect on a bank’s balance sheet, asset 
(loan portfolio) quality and profitability.  When a debtor stops paying back the loan, 
after a specific time period set by supervisory authorities, the loan will be 
characterized as non-performing. 
 
As non-performing, it was widely used to classify a loan that had past due which 
exceeded the 90 days criterion while a loan with less than 90 days past due, was 
considered to be a performing loan without any impact on a bank’s reporting.  
However, this rule was not adopted by all governments and their Central Banks.  
Taking into account the need to overcome the definition of NPLs problem and as a 
result to adopt common reporting standards at EU level, the European Banking 
Authority (EBA), issued in July 2014 the “EBA FINAL draft Implementing Technical 
Standards on Supervisory reporting on forbearance and non-performing exposures 
under article 99(4) of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013”.  The adoption of these guidelines 
and reporting standards by financial institutions was strongly encouraged by 
supervisory authorities as it was used in exercises such as Asset Quality Review (AQR), 
Stress Test etc. 
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According to EBA, Non-Performing Exposures (NPEs) are the exposures that satisfy one 
or all of the following criteria:  
 Exposures that have over 90 days past due. 
 There is an assessment of the borrower being unable to repay its credit 
obligations (Unlikely-to-Pay criterion, UtP).  For this criterion there is not any 
consideration of days past due and collaterals are not realised.   
 Exposures are either impaired or defaulted. 
 
It should be mentioned that NPLs are include in the above mentioned term as NPEs 
refer to all credit exposures such as loans, debt securities as well as loan 
commitments.  However, the terms NPLs and NPEs are used interchangeably.  Another 
important aspect of the NPE definition is the “pulling effect” where all the exposures 
of one borrower are considered to be non-performing, even if 20% and more of its 
exposures have past due greater than 90 days.   
 
Furthermore, EBA provides guidelines regarding forbearance measures that financial 
institutions can implement and especially in the viability assessment of these practices.  
Before implementing any forbearance measures, banks are obliged to conduct 
thorough affordability assessments.  These measures are strongly correlated not only 
with the financial situation of a debtor but also with the market conditions that may 
likely affect its ability to pay back the debt.    In a way they are adjustments to the 
covenants (terms) of a loan agreement with the sole purpose of helping a borrower 
that is facing financial difficulties to repay its debt.  The aim of forbearance measures is 
to help debtors either to avert entrance of a performing exposure to non-performing 
status or to exit the non-performing status.   
 
A forborne exposure can classified as performing or as non-performing.  A forborne 
exposure is considered to be performing when there are not any past due more than 
90 days (after the implementation of restructuring measures), the past due amounts 
or written-off prior the restructuring have been paid and there are not any other non-
performing exposures.  Following the implementation of forbearance measures, the 
exposure will be monitored for one year in order to determine the viability of the 
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restructuring and repayment of the debt.  During this year, which is called “cure 
period”, the exposure will be classified as “non-performing forborne”.  After the 
expiration of the “cure period”, the exposure will be monitored for at least two more 
years and will classified as “performing forborne”.  At the end of the probation period, 
the exposure will be classified as “performing” (only if there is not any kind of 
deterioration of the borrower e.g. no past due).     
3.2 Determinants 
In the previous chapter, we presented the determinants of the NPLs, through various 
empirical studies (Louzis et al., 2011, Beck et al., 2013, EBA, 2016a and many others).  
All these studies have identified macroeconomic and microeconomic (bank-specific) 
variables that affect the NPLs of a country.  Each country is affected differently by its 
amount of NPLs. In theory, a developed country has the infrastructure and institutional 
framework to cope with the lesser shocks and more effectively the increase of the 
NPLs. To sum it up we can identify the following determinants. 
 
Regarding the macroeconomic factors, we have: 
 The growth rate of an economy, has a negative correlation with the NPLs, since 
in times of recession, financial institutions apply stringent criteria to grant a 
loan due to the increase numbers of impaired loans. 
 Real estate prices, are negatively correlated with the NPLs as a decrease to RE 
prices, due to a decrease in demand and an increase in supply, will result in an 
increase of NPLs.  As a result, loans and exposures with real estate as collateral 
will be affected.   
 Interest rates, which increase when borrowers have difficulty in repaying their 
obligations (late fees), and consequently causes an increase to the NPLs due to 
the increased interest payments.  Another example is the case of floating rate 
loans (Louzis et al., 2012). 
 The unemployment rate has a positive correlation with the NPLs as an increase 
in unemployment, leads to a decrease of a borrower’s income, which affects its 
ability to repay the debt.  Changes in unemployment is considered a good 
indicator of the recession (Charalambakis et al., 2017). 
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 Inflation,  affects NPLs in a positive way as an increase of inflation will lead to a 
decrease of the real income of a debtor which will consequently affect the 
repayment of its debtor (Beck et al., 2013 & Klein, 2013) 
 
Regarding the bank specific, we can identify as significant determinants of NPLs, the 
risk management practices of a bank, the corporate governance, and management 
quality of a financial institution, the risk appetite of a bank (lending behavior), capital 
ratios and loan loss provisions.  The reasons and the rationale behind these choices 
have been explained in the literature review chapter.  
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 4. Management of Non-Performing Loans 
In this section, we are going to discuss methods that have already been applied or 
going to be applied, in order to mitigate the risk that NPLs impose in the financial 
stability of Europe and the world in general.  We begin with a brief presentation of the 
methods that were proposed by SSM through the guidelines that issued in early 2017 
and already banks use for managing this problem internally.  Afterwards, we move to 
the methods applied when management of NPLs is performed externally by 
implementing different approaches.   
 
The selection of internal or external NPLs management methods depends on a number 
of factors such as the extent of the problem, the country and its legislation, the size of 
the financial institution, its strategic goals etc. Scardovi (2016), recommends as a 
selection criterion the comparison of the NPL’s portfolio Net Present Value (NPV) with 
its liquidation-market and fair value.  The calculation of the NPV is derived from the 
future expected cash flows, excluding direct (e.g. legal and court fees) and indirect 
costs (e.g. employees salary) and discounted at a rate that considers credit risk, 
recovery period and market volatility.  When the fair value of the NPL portfolio is 
greater than the NPV, then the bank should incorporate internal management 
methods.  If the fair value is greater than the NPV and the liquidation value is smaller 
than the NPV, then it is prudent for the bank, apart from managing internally the NPLs, 
to consider also the external management methods such as the direct sale of the NPL 
portfolio to a third party.  Finally, in the case of the liquidation value being greater 
than the NPV, the bank should only consider the external management methods. 
4.1 Internal management of NPLs 
The implementation of an internal management approach requires the existence of 
highly specialized and knowledgeable personnel, an NPL Workout Unit.  This Workout 
Unit must not be the same as the unit responsible for granting the loan, in order to 
avoid any conflict of interest.  We can identify the following methods in the internal 
management approach; forbearance measures, legal processes and 
foreclosure/liquidation.   
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4.1.1 Forbearance Measures 
Forbearance measures, as it was explained in the previous chapter, are in a way 
adjustments to the covenants (terms) of a loan agreement with the sole purpose of 
helping a borrower that is facing financial difficulties to repay its debt.  The 
implementation of forbearance measures should aim to the repayment of a debt 
which will consequently contribute to the sustainability of a borrower and not to 
postpone the recognition of the exposure as impaired or defaulted so that a bank can 
manipulate its financial reports.  In order to ascertain the best possible solution for 
both borrower and bank, the bank compares the Net Present Value (NPV) of the 
proposed restructuring plan (i.e. future cash flows that will be paid during the 
repayment period of the restructuring plan) with the NPV of the liquidation process 
(foreclosure and auction of collaterals).  However, an important aspect that banks 
should examine, apart from the above-mentioned NPV comparison, is the future 
impact on the borrower’s growth and sustainability that will further affect the 
economy.  The restructuring solutions that banks provide can be categorised, based on 
the time horizon, into short and long-term measures (ECB, 2017, Basel Committee, 
2016).   
 
Short-term restructuring solutions are measures applied to help borrowers that face 
temporary difficulties in keeping up with the debt repayment plan.  It should be noted 
that these solutions have a strict time constrain of two years maximum application.  An 
example of this kind forbearance measures is the granting of a grace period where the 
borrower has the chance not to make any kind of payment (either principal or interest 
or both) for a specific time period, usually up to one year (rarely up to two years).  
Another short-term solution is the payment of interest only or the reduction of the of 
the payment instalment.  Table 1 has more examples of short-term measures. 
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Table 1 Forbearance Solutions 
 
         Source: ECB, Bank of Greece 
 
In the case of long-term measures, the bank can provide the borrower with more 
permanent solutions in repaying the debt.  Reduction of the interest rate is one of the 
most commonly used solution as well as the acquirement of additional collateral 
(usually real estate collaterals as these have higher value).  Another measure is the 
reduction of the debt by voluntary sell of a borrower’s asset/property (sometimes a 
property used by the bank as collateral) or/and the write-off of a part of the debt.  If 
these two are combined, a bank can write-off part of the debt that cannot claim in the 
future due to lack of additional collateral.  Therefore, there will remain part of the debt 
that is viable and can be repaid in the future.  Finally, it is worth noting that all the 
aforementioned plans can be applied separately or in tandem depending on the 
borrower while in a long-term plan there is also the capability of implementing short-
term solutions (long-term plans can be used in tandem with short-term ones). 
 
The key element and prerequisite in the consideration of applying forbearance 
measures, is the viability of the restructuring plan.  To simplify, it should answer the 
following question; will this plan lead to a reduction in the borrower’s debt?    
 
4.1.2 Recovery - Foreclosure - Liquidation 
In this stage, there are cases of NPLs that the assessment for viable forbearance 
measures was negative i.e. the examination of a borrower’s capability to repay the 
debt through a viable restructuring plan.  The bank will start the legal process that will 
lead to the repayment of the debt or part of it based on the collaterals’ value (secured 
or non-secured loans).  Before proceeding with the foreclosure and auction of a 
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collateral, the bank can accept the voluntary sale of a borrower’s property (even if it is 
used as a collateral of a loan), to repay the total or part of the loan.  Similar solution 
with the above is the voluntary surrender of an asset.  Another method that the bank’s 
workout unit can apply is the seizure of receivables such as rent from a property or 
other claims that the borrower has from third parties.  Finally, the bank could examine 
the possibility of full debt write-off under specific circumstances.  Table 2 has more 
examples of foreclosure and liquidation measures.   
 
Table 2 Resolution & Closure Solutions 
 
Source: ECB, Bank of Greece 
 
4.1.3 Debt-to-Asset/Equity Swap 
Debt-to-Equity/Asset Swap is a method used to exchange a borrower’s debt or part of 
it, with a borrower’s equity or assets.  As a result the debt will either be eliminated or 
reduced to more manageable levels and the borrower (especially in the case of a 
company) will be able to continue to operate.  In the case of debt-to-asset swap, we 
can observe that it is similar with the voluntary sale of a borrower’s property (asset) to 
a third party with the difference the third party is the bank.  This method can be used 
in both the aforementioned stages, as a restructuring measure or as recovery solution.  
Finally, the bank should exercise great caution in adopting this solution and there has 
to be careful consideration and examination of all available data in order to avoid 
acquiring an asset that will not allow the bank to extract the asset’s accurate value in 
the appropriate time horizon (ECB, 2017). 
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4.2 External management of NPLs 
In the external NPLs management methods, the bank applies solutions that affect 
instantly its balance sheet as the NPLs are removed from it.  The most commonly used 
methods for managing externally the NPLs are the joint ventures, the direct sales, 
asset management companies and securitization.   
4.2.1 Joint Venture (JV) 
By entering in a joint venture arrangement, the bank can co-operate with a third party 
to manage the NPLs.  The third party can contribute in this arrangement with cash, 
experienced personnel, know-how and competencies.  As a result, the risk of the NPLs 
portfolio will be shared as well as the gains from managing such portfolios (Campos et 
al. 2018).  This method is the exception of the off-balance aspect as the bank keeps the 
NPLs on its balance sheet even though it transfers its NPLs to an SPV – Special Purpose 
Vehicle.  An example of such a joint venture arrangement is the case of the platform 
Pillarstone of the KKR investment firm and two Greek banks (Alpha Bank and 
Eurobank) in 2016.  Another example of JV is the Project Solar which is an agreement 
between the 4 Greek systemic Banks and doBank S.p.A. for the management of €1.8bn 
SME NPE common borrowers (Piraeus Bank, corporate announcement).   
 
4.2.2 Direct Sale  
In this case, the bank sells directly a portfolio of NPLs to a third party (e.g. investment 
firms and hedge funds) directly or through an SPV.  The major benefit for the bank is 
the immediate removal from its balance sheet.  In addition, it is a method that does 
not require a lot of effort from the side of the bank and it is quick.  However, the bank 
will report a one-off loss as a result of the difference between the price that the NPLs 
were sold and their book value (ECB, 2017, Campos et al. 2018).  An example of direct 
sale is the case of Piraeus Bank SA and project Amoeba, the sale of a corporate loans 
portfolio total amount of €1,950mn of legal claims (€1,450mn gross book value) with 
Bain Capital Credit LP (Piraeus Bank, corporate announcement).   
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4.2.3 Asset Management Company (AMC)  
An AMC is a company that acquires a bank’s (or sometimes more than one bank) NPLs 
with the sole purpose to reduce or even eliminate them in the future (usually in a long 
time horizon).  This company, depending on the ownership structure, it can be 
classified as Government/ State- backed when the State sponsors it or private if it is 
sponsored by individuals such as other banks (sometimes the bank that the NPLs are 
originated) and private funds.  The main benefit of this method is the clean-up of a 
bank’s balance sheet as its NPLs are transferred to the AMC (Lehmann, 2017 and 
Lehmann, 2018).  Therefore, the uncertainty of the bank’s asset quality is reduced 
which will further affect positively its capital requirements.  Another benefit of an 
AMC, is that by gathering NPLs of the same class (e.g. mortgage loans or commercial 
loans secured with real estate properties), the AMC can achieve greater recovery rate 
as it will be able to incorporate economies of scale.  In addition, there will not be any 
kind of high demand from shareholders to reduce the NPLs contrary to the banks that 
hold the NPLs.  As a result, the AMC will have at its disposal more time to reduce the 
NPLs and consequently, it will be able to sell the assets used as collaterals at more 
favourable prices and avoid fire sales (Financial Stability, 2nd progress report, 2018).   
 
However, an AMC (and especially in State sponsored ones) to succeed in the 
maximization of its NPLs value, should have suitable valuation methods and competent 
corporate governance.  Regarding corporate governance, it is worth mentioned that 
there should not be any kind of conflict and meddling from political figures or parties.  
Another factor impeding the success of an AMC is the type of exposures that the 
company acquires.  It has been shown that an AMC manages to succeed in its objective 
of maximizing NPLs value when the exposures are backed with real estate assets like 
mortgage loans or development loans.  This is due to the fact that prices of real estate 
depend on the market conditions of an economy.  Finally, the establishment of an 
AMC costs a lot of money and requires significant investment in developing 
appropriate infrastructure in IT systems, procedures and human resources.  Examples 
of state-owned AMCs in Europe, is the case of Ireland with NAMA in 2010 and the case 
of Spain with SAREB in 2012 (Campos et al. 2018).    
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4.2.4 Securitization  
Securitization is a method used to transform a combination of assets pooled together 
with their expected cash flows, into interest bearing securities to be traded in the 
market or sometimes to be used as collateral for financing from Central Banks.  These 
assets if are secured, their collaterals follow the securities (Asset-Backed Securities).  In 
the case of NPLs securitization, the bank transfers the non-performing assets to a third 
party usually an SPV, which issues interest bearing securities.  These securities (debt 
instruments) are then traded in the market in different tranches.  The SPV will assign a 
servicer – usually a third party but sometimes the originator (seller) of the assets (i.e. 
the bank) – to manage the NPLs and collect the expected cash flows.  The cash flows 
that the NPLs will generate are paid to the SPV, which will then use these funds to pay 
interest and principal to the investors of the debt securities (Caselli et al. 2017, Fell et 
al. 2017).  The two important factors that affect the success of a NPLs securitization is 
the quality of the assets to be transferred to the SPV (as high quality of assets will be 
easier to predict expected cash flows) and the ability of the servicer (high competency 
of the servicer will lead to an increase of cash flows).   
 
Due to the fact that NPLs are transferred to the SPV, the bank’s balance sheet will be 
cleaned of any NPLs and consequently its credit risk will be reduced significantly.  
However, the complexity of the method in combination with the high-imposed 
regulatory charges, makes it more difficult for European banks to implement it.  This 
method has been applied in Italy, which issued senior tranche notes backed by the 
government’s guarantee (Popolare di Bari, Carige and Creval with total volume of €3 
billions).  An alternative to a state guarantee is the incorporation of private insurance.  
This will help the SPV to sell the securities at a lower price as the risk will be reduced 
due to the insurance (Campos et al. 2018). 
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5. IFRS 9 and the impact on NPLs 
In this section, there is going to be a brief presentation of the new financial standard 
(IFRS 9), that its implementation has become mandatory in Europe, and to be more 
precise in its impact on NPLs.     
5.1 The new accounting standard 
As a consequence of the global financial crisis, the G20, in collaboration with the 
International Accounting Standards Board (IASB), issued new guidelines for the 
classification and measurement of financial instruments.  IFRS 9 "Financial 
Instruments" refers to the classification, measurement, impairment and hedge 
accounting of financial assets and liabilities. It replaced IAS 39 "Financial Instruments: 
Recognition and Measurement", and its implementation is mandatory from January 
1st 2018. The transition to the new standard has an impact on the readjustment on 
banks’ financial reporting and a drastic increase in provisions, eventually leading to a 
reduction in capital ratios (requirements).  The model addresses a key issue of the 
financial crisis, ex post recognition of losses and introduces a forward model of 
expected credit losses (3-stages impairment depending on the credit deterioration of 
loans portfolios).       
 
One of the most important aspect of this standard is the new approach for the 
calculation of the impairment allowances, the Expected Credit Loss (ECL), which 
replaced the incurred loss approach of the previous standards, IAS 39.  The failure in 
many financial institutions to recognise credit losses derived from financial 
instruments and to report them in a timely manner was perhaps the most important 
reason for the increased capital requirements during the GFC.  IAS 39 approach was 
heavily criticized for the delayed recognition of credit losses.  It prescribed the ex post 
recognition of credit losses, while the "loss event" and its "reliably measurable impact" 
were subject to many interpretations and, therefore, ambiguity. The model thus 
proved "too little, too late" (Picker et al., 2016).  This negative aspect of the IAS 39 
attempts to correct the ECL method of IFRS 9.  The ECL approach is a method that 
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incorporates a forward calculation of loss allowances for loan portfolios, by taking into 
account criteria based on various economic and risks variables.  It provides a 
probability-weighted result that reflects the time value of money and the best possible 
information available at the reporting date (past events, current conditions, 
reasonable and supportive information). 
 
Empirical studies such as Gebhardt and Novotny-Farkas (2011), Oosterbosch (2010) 
and Ozili (2017) reinforce the argument that the stricter rules in accounting for loan 
loss provisions and the adoption of IAS 39 have contributed significantly to reducing 
procyclicality.  Leventis et al. (2011), analyse data from 91 European banks in order to 
show that the adoption of IFRS has curtailed the opportunistic behavior of banks’ 
managers and has significantly reduced earnings manipulation through the LLPs.  Onali 
and Ginesti (2014) point out to a broadly positive response of investors to the 
accounting reform of the financial instruments evaluation model.  According to their 
findings, investors seem convinced that IFRS 9 adequately addresses the problems that 
had arisen from IAS 39.  In addition, they consider beneficial the existence of common, 
internationally accepted accounting principles and standards that contribute to 
uniformity, comparability and reliability.   
 
Under the new accounting practice (IFRS 9), all exposures are considered as a source of 
future credit risk (Gebhardt, Novotny-Farkas 2011), which is accounted for from the 
first day of their recognition.  There is a strong correlation between the probability of 
default and macroeconomic factors such as growth rates, inflation, interest rates, 
unemployment, various market indicators and the overall economic situation and 
institutional framework of a country. The assessment of loan impairment is made with 
criteria that are more stringent and studies has shown that will increase loan loss 
provisions (Plata et al., 2017; Ntaikou, Vousinas, 2018). 
5.2 Impairment  
Financial institutions are required to calculate expected loan losses due to defaults at 
each reporting date (publication date of their financial statements).  Estimates of loan 
losses indicate potential credit risk. Impairment losses - which are calculated based on 
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accounting rules and information - decrease the value of the financial instrument for 
which they are formed and are recognized in the income statement as an expense 
(Gebhardt, Novotny-Farkas, 2011).  IFRS 9 addresses a key issue of the financial crisis, 
the late recognition of credit losses. A new three-stage evaluation process is 
introduced; Expected Credit Loss (ECL) model. The calculation of ECL, is a probability-
weighted result that takes into account the time value of money and all the best 
possible information available at the reporting date (past events, current conditions 
and other information that will help in the future risk inference).  The new impairment 
approach is applicable to financial assets measured at amortised cost, financial assets 
measured at FVOCI, loan commitments and financial guarantee contracts not 
measured at FVPL and lease receivables (Picker et al., 2016). 
 
5.2.1 Three - stage evaluation 
Contrary to the approach in IAS 39, the new model calculates impairment allowances 
for a bank’s loan portfolio before an actual loss event becomes real. Impairment of a 
financial instrument is defined as the expected loss in contractual cash flows over its 
residual life and is evaluated in three (3) stages.  As a transition criterion from one 
stage to the next is the indication of a significant change in credit risk from the date of 
the initial recognition of the instrument. Therefore, the initial estimate of expected 
future losses is redefined at each reporting date and reflects changes in the credit 
quality of a financial asset. 
 
Stage 1 
It refers to financial instruments that credit risk have not changed since inception date 
or low credit risk without significant deterioration at the reporting date. Expected 
credit losses are calculated from the first day, taking into account the default 
probability for the next 12 months since the reporting date, while interest income is 
calculated at the gross carrying amount of the asset. 
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Stage 2 
In this stage, we find non-impaired financial instruments with a significant 
deterioration in their credit risk since the date of initial recognition, but no valid 
evidence of default and inability to pay back the loan. This category contains non-
defaulted exposures (performing portfolio), performing exposures with more than 30 
days past due, exposures with early warning signs and forborne exposures. The 
impairment approach is based on all potential default events that may occur not only 
in the next 12 months, but also over the expected life of the asset (lifetime ECL) and 
interest income arises from the gross carrying amount. 
 
Stage 3 
In this stage, we have objective evidence of impairment of the financial instrument at 
the reporting date and the asset has been categorized as non-performing. Indicatively, 
we have cases of exposures with more than 90 days of past due, forborne exposures 
with past due, Unlikely-to-Pay, non-performing exposures, default cases, debt 
securities with an external credit rating that corresponds to bankruptcy, and financial 
assets acquired, with a large discount due to being already credit-impaired (Purchased 
or Originated Credit Impaired -  POCI). Stage 3 exposures are determined according to 
the default definition of the Capital Requirements Regulation (CRR 575/2013).  
According to the article 178 of CRR, a borrower is in “default” if the institution 
considers that the obligor is unlikely to pay its credit obligations to the institution (UtP 
criterion) and/or the obligor is past due more than 90 days on any material credit 
obligation to the institution (delay criterion).  Impairment is assessed in the same 
manner as in stage 2 (Lifetime ECL). Interest revenue is now based on the net carrying 
amount of the instrument. 
 
Financial instruments, which fall under the above-mentioned stages 1 and 2, are 
usually assessed on a collective basis. In IAS 39 it was the performing portfolio and the 
calculation of impairment was not significantly affected by credit risk parameters and 
models. In particular, there was no provisioning or formation of collective provision in 
cases of imminent exposure. Even if the credit risk was significant, it was taken into 
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account only when it affected the asset, as it is calculated in IFRS 9 Stage 3 (Incurred 
But Not Reported - IBNR). 
 
Forborne exposures of Stage 3, remain in this stage for at least 3 years. If at the end of 
the three years there was not any delay in payments and there are no signs of 
deterioration in credit risk and no indication of default, then the asset can be 
transferred to stage two where it should remain for at least a year. Under the above-
mentioned conditions, the asset can then move to Stage 1 and be assessed as 
performing loans based on default probabilities within the next twelve months. It is 
reasonable that viable forbearance measures can lead to sustainable repayment and 
thus a gradual reduction of impairment provisions (Plata et al., 2017). To sum it up, it is 
evident that the transition of an instrument from Stage 1 to Stage 2 can cause a 
significant increase in the provision for impairment, which will have an impact of the 
profit or loss of an institution and thus its capital.  Figure 1 presents the main features 
of the 3 stages approach of the new standard. 
 
Figure 1 Expected Credit Loss 
 
Source: PwC 2014 
 
5.2.2 Measurement of expected credit losses 
The Expected Credit Losses (ECLs) of a financial instrument over a reporting period 
reflect the weighted average probability of loss that may arise from default events 
  -33- 
during its residual life.  Credit loss is defined as the difference between the remaining 
contractual cash flows to be received and the expected cash flows discounted to the 
reporting date.  Therefore, ECLs essentially represent the present value of all expected 
cash flows.  The life of a financial instrument is defined as the duration of its maximum 
contractual and initial life, without taking into account any renewals or extensions that 
may occur in the future. Revolving credits, which are evaluated over a longer period 
(overdraft accounts, credit cards), are excluded. 
 
ECL can be calculated with the following mathematical formula (Ernst & Young, 2018): 
 
 
where r is the effective interest rate at initial recognition and t is the time horizon of 
the assessment.  
 
Probability of Default (LGD) 
Expresses the likelihood that the borrower will default.  In stage 1, the probability of 
default refers to possible events that will take place within the next 12 months, while 
in stage 2 it covers the entire life of the financial instrument. In stage 3, the default is 
now a fact and the PD is equal to 1 or 100%. 
 
Loss Given a Default (LGD) 
LGD shows the percentage of failure to recover the value of a financial instrument, 
taking into account any collateral and planned payments (calculated as 1 minus the 
recovery rate considering collateral and collection action). The LGD is affected, 
specifically, by the estimated value of the instrument at that time, the type, value and 
time required to realize on the collateral (liquidation and foreclosure procedures), as 
well as whether or not a contractual repayment plan is maintained. 
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Exposure At Default (EAD) 
The book value of the financial instrument (credit exposure) at the time of default, 
indicating the exposure of the financial institution to risk at that time.  For example, in 
case of bank loan EAD is the loan balance at the time of default. 
 
Under IAS 39 portfolio valuation was based on objective events that took place after 
initial recognition.  In IFRS 9, the default risk is calculated at different times and the 
results are taken into account and discounted to reflect the time value of money.  
However, one negative aspect of the new standard is the lack of definition for the 
"default" term, even though past due of more than 90 days is a valid presumption of 
default and inability to pay.  Financial institutions have the discretion to define the 
"default" and are obliged to disclose the criteria for the adopted default definition. 
 
To determine a significant increase in credit risk and the probability of default, various 
information and factors are taken into account, which differ depending on the type of 
financial instrument and risk category (Ernst & Young, 2016).  These are valid 
information which are collected without effort or cost, dealing with not only the past 
and present situation but also forecasts, which contribute to the assessment of a 
number of factors whose deterioration may be the cause of an increase in credit risk 
and the likelihood of default. 
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6. Methodology of Analysis 
This section of the study will focus on the methodology that will be implemented in 
order to assess the management of Greek NPLs and the impact of IFRS 9 
implementation on the four Greek systemic banks.  There will be a brief presentation 
of the ratios that will be used in the aforementioned assessment.  
6.1 Financial Ratios Analysis 
In this study, we are going to assess the financial ratios that are commonly used by not 
only the Supervisory Authorities (ECB, EBA, BoG) but also in the relevant literature 
review that has already been discussed.  One of the most frequently used methods to 
examine the soundness of a financial institution is the CAMEL method that is similar 
with the financial ratios methods that we apply here.  Christopoulos et al. (2011), apply 
CAMELS to determine the predictive ability of this method in the case of Lehman 
Brothers’ bankruptcy.  The following assessment will be two fold; first we focus on the 
analysis of financial ratios with regard to the asset quality, capital adequacy, 
profitability, efficiency and liquidity of these four banks.  On the second part we 
examine the impact of the First Time Adoption (FTA) of the new accounting standard 
(IFRS 9) to Greek banks.  It should be noted, that as this research is about the 
management of NPLs, there is a strong focus on the asset quality of the banks’ balance 
sheet. 
6.1.1 Asset Quality 
In this category, we are assessing ratios regarding NPLs and NPEs and their coverage 
through loan loss provisions.  The definitions of NPLs and NPEs, have thoroughly 
explained in a previous section.  NPLs and NPEs ratios, are the NPLs and NPEs over 
gross loans.  High value of these ratios can be interpreted as a high probability of bank 
failure due to participation in high-risk lending policies.  The coverage ratios examine 
the percentage of NPLs or NPEs that are covered by LLR.  The higher these ratios are 
the better for the bank.   
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6.1.2 Capital Adequacy 
This is an important aspect of a bank’s financial position that is strongly supervised by 
Central Banks, as it is a measure of a bank’s stability.  It is the percentage (as we 
discuss about ratios) of minimum capital that a bank must have in order to be able to 
absorb losses and thus be viable.  In this study we incorporate the total capital 
adequacy ratio which consists of Tier 1 and Tier 2 capital.  It is prudent to mention that 
apart from the general minimum requirements that Basel Accord determines, the 
supervisor responsible for each bank (a team that consists of ECB and National Central 
Banks and is called Joint Supervisory Team – JST) can set additional minimum 
requirements which are decided through the Supervisory Review and Evaluation 
Process (SREP).        
6.1.3 Profitability 
The most commonly used ratios to assess a bank’s profitability is the ROE, ROAE, ROA, 
ROAA and NIM.  In this study, we examine the profitability of a bank through its net 
interest margin.  NIM for short, is the difference between the interest that a bank pays 
(deposits) and the interest that earns (loans) over the total interest earning assets. 
6.1.4 Efficiency 
In order to evaluate the efficiency of a bank, we are going to examine the ratio cost-to-
income.  This ratio is a clear indicator of the efficiency of a bank as it measures 
operating expenses over the operating income.  The higher the ratio the less efficient 
and thus profitable a bank is and the opposite.   
6.1.5 Liquidity 
A good measure of a bank’s liquidity is the ratio of loan-to-deposits.  This ratio is 
calculated as the total outstanding loans to total deposits that a bank has.  Low-value 
of this ratio means that the bank uses its own deposits to give loans, which can be 
interpreted as low profitability.  On the other hand, high-value of this ratio means that 
the bank has not enough liquidity and thus needs to borrow money to re-loan it to its 
customers.  This however, can lead to higher profitability as it lends money to higher 
rates than it has borrowed.     
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6.2 Data Description 
The financial data that were used in this dissertation were downloaded from Thomson 
One database as well as the banks’ web sites.  We did not use Bankscope database of 
Bureau and Van Dijk because quarterly data are not available in this database while in 
Thomson One are.  In addition, the data for the Greek macroeconomic indices were 
obtained from OECD database.  The period that we selected to assess is Q1 2016- Q3 
2018 because capital controls were already imposed for the last six months.  
Therefore, the Greek economy and the banking system was already adapted (to an 
extent) to this measure.  The rationale behind the choice of the four systemic banks 
was not only due to the importance of these financial institutions to the Greek 
financial system but also because these banks are supervised directly from ECB 
through SSM.  Therefore, all the previous discussion of managing NPLs (NPEs) in the 
Europe are applicable to Greece and these four banks.   
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7. Empirical Results and Analysis 
In this section, we are going to examine the case of the four Greek systemic Banks and 
particularly the issue of NPLs and the impact on their performance.  In addition, we are 
going to examine the impact of the IFRS 9 implementation on these four banks.  The 
ratios that were used have been described in the previous section. 
   
7.1 Brief overview of the Greek economy 
In the last 8 years, Greece has undergone considerable structural improvements, 
which resulted in the creation of investment opportunities and in general to be a more 
business friendly country.  The completion of the adjustment programme in August 
2018 combined with the debt relief measures agreed by the Eurogroup, which made 
the Greek debt sustainable, had a positive impact in the recovery of the investors’ 
confidence.  Economic growth has returned in the last year with the GDP increasing by 
2.1% as a result of the increase of exports in goods and services and private 
consumption.  However, an important problem for the Greek economy is the high rate 
of unemployment, despite the decreased in the last couple of years.  It should be 
noted that this decrease in unemployment is due to the fact that a great number of 
Greeks have emigrated in their search for a better employment perspectives while the 
prevalent employment in Greece is part-time and temporary (BoG 2018). 
 
The improvement in the Greek economy affected positively the Greek banking system.  
Even though banks’ asset quality improved, as a result of the decrease in NPEs, the 
high level of NPEs is still a major issue for Greece.  Moreover, due to the easing of 
capital controls, the confidence in the banking system returned and as a result the 
increase of deposits (4.4% increase in 2018). 
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7.2 Greek Banks and NPLs 
The GFC affected tremendously the Greek economy and as a result the banking sector.  
The volume of NPLs has increased significantly since 2009, which resulted in the 
recapitalisation of the Greek banks 3 times already.      
 
Asset Quality 
As it was previously mentioned, Greek banks in the last decade are having significant 
issues with the volume of their troubled assets and specifically with NPLs, 
consequence of Greek economy’s downturn.  As we can observe from Table 3 
(Appendix section), Piraeus Bank has a bigger problem than the other 3 banks, even 
though in the last 3 years there has been a considerable effort to reduce NPLs.  
Specifically, PB has managed to reduce NPLs from Q1 2016 to Q3 2018 by €8,719mil 
(33.05%) while NBG, a bank in better position than the other three, managed to 
reduce its NPLs by €7,275mil (37.38%).  The NPLs decline is due to the restructuring 
plan that the banks have implemented these years which incorporates forbearance 
measures, sales of NPLs, liquidations (mostly auctions of real estate collaterals) and 
collections.      
 
Table 3 Volume of NPLs 
 
                                                       Source: Based on data from the banks’ financial reports                        
 
Regarding the NPL ratio, PB managed to reduce this ratio by 6.50% while Alpha, 
Eurobank and NBG by 3.30%, 3.90% and 3.20% respectively.  In respect to NPLs 
coverage ratio, we can observe that NBG and PB have greater coverage than the other 
two, which equals to 82.40% and 78.80% respectively. 
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Table 4 NPLs Ratio & NPLs Coverage Ratio 
Period Piraeus Alpha Eurobank NBG Period Piraeus Alpha Eurobank NBG
2016 Q1 40.00% 37.40% 34.80% 33.60% 2016 Q1 66.00% 69.70% 64.41% 74.50%
2016 Q2 39.20% 37.80% 34.70% 34.00% 2016 Q2 66.80% 69.00% 64.99% 77.00%
2016 Q3 38.80% 38.30% 35.40% 34.00% 2016 Q3 68.00% 68.00% 65.48% 73.00%
2016 Q4 37.50% 38.10% 34.70% 33.00% 2016 Q4 69.50% 69.00% 65.98% 74.00%
2017 Q1 37.80% 38.10% 34.80% 33.00% 2017 Q1 68.00% 69.00% 65.64% 74.00%
2017 Q2 37.10% 37.60% 34.60% 33.80% 2017 Q2 68.20% 69.00% 65.19% 74.20%
2017 Q3 36.20% 37.30% 35.20% 34.10% 2017 Q3 69.70% 68.00% 65.53% 74.10%
2017 Q4 35.00% 34.90% 33.40% 32.40% 2017 Q4 83.00% 67.00% 64.23% 74.70%
2018 Q1 35.50% 35.20% 33.20% 31.00% 2018 Q1 89.00% 73.00% 70.12% 82.90%
2018 Q2 33.10% 35.60% 32.50% 30.50% 2018 Q2 80.70% 73.00% 69.45% 82.80%
2018 Q3 33.50% 34.10% 30.90% 30.40% 2018 Q3 78.80% 69.00% 68.00% 82.40%
NPLs Ratio NPLs Coverage
 
Source: Data from the banks’ financial reports                        
 
 
Similar results can be observed for the NPEs of these four banks.  Based on Q3 2018 
data, NPEs decreased by 22.65% for PB, 17.39% for Alpha, 22.02% for Eurobank and 
41.86% for NBG compared to Q1 2016.   
 
Table 5 Volume of NPEs  
Period Piraeus Alpha Eurobank NBG
2016 Q1 36,900 32,200 22,685 28,962
2016 Q2 36,800 32,300 23,019 26,406
2016 Q3 36,700 32,400 23,499 25,133
2016 Q4 36,200 32,400 22,897 23,152
2017 Q1 35,545 32,300 22,595 22,854
2017 Q2 34,866 31,700 22,101 22,422
2017 Q3 33,774 31,400 21,609 22,135
2017 Q4 32,856 29,300 20,125 21,199
2018 Q1 32,150 29,000 19,665 17,517
2018 Q2 29,387 28,800 19,032 17,015
2018 Q3 28,542 26,600 17,688 16,838
NPEs
 
Source: Based on data from the banks’ financial reports 
 
The NPE ratio despite the moderate reduction remains high for all four Greek systemic 
banks.  The highest NPE ratio is noted in PB (54.10% in Q3 2018), even though the bank 
managed to reduce it by 9.33% since Q1 2016.  Following PB, Alpha has the second 
highest NPEs ratio (Q3 2018 49.90%) with a significantly lower than PB, decrease of 
2.20% since Q1 2016.  The NPE coverage by cumulative provisions has increased 
significantly in the Q1 2018 for all banks, mainly due to the adoption of IFRS 9 and the 
recognition of additional provisions. In Q2 2018 and Q3 2018, the NPE coverage has 
dropped slightly, as a result of loans sales and write-offs that banks performed.   
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Table 6 NPEs Ratio & NPEs Coverage Ratio 
Period Piraeus Alpha Eurobank NBG Period Piraeus Alpha Eurobank NBG
2016 Q1 63.43% 52.10% 44.20% 50.00% 2016 Q1 47.00% 50.00% 50.71% 74.00%
2016 Q2 52.10% 52.60% 45.10% 45.80% 2016 Q2 47.00% 49.00% 49.94% 54.30%
2016 Q3 52.00% 53.20% 46.40% 44.20% 2016 Q3 47.20% 49.00% 49.90% 56.30%
2016 Q4 52.00% 53.70% 45.20% 43.60% 2016 Q4 46.80% 49.00% 50.65% 55.90%
2017 Q1 51.90% 53.80% 45.00% 43.60% 2017 Q1 46.10% 49.00% 50.76% 56.00%
2017 Q2 52.30% 53.70% 44.10% 45.10% 2017 Q2 45.00% 48.00% 51.15% 55.70%
2017 Q3 55.30% 53.60% 44.70% 45.20% 2017 Q3 45.50% 48.00% 51.60% 55.90%
2017 Q4 56.00% 51.70% 42.60% 44.00% 2017 Q4 52.00% 45.00% 50.36% 55.10%
2018 Q1 55.70% 51.80% 41.80% 42.70% 2018 Q1 50.80% 50.00% 56.10% 60.20%
2018 Q2 54.70% 51.90% 40.70% 42.10% 2018 Q2 48.90% 50.00% 55.90% 60.20%
2018 Q3 54.10% 49.90% 39.00% 42.00% 2018 Q3 48.80% 47.00% 53.70% 59.80%
NPEs Ratio NPEs Coverage
 
Source: Based on data from the banks’ financial reports 
 
Capital Adequacy 
Based on the data presented in the following table, we can observe that even though 
there is a significant decrease in the regulatory capital ratio (RCR) since Q1 2016 (for 
PB and NBG), it is still in compliance with the CRD IV rules and Overall Capital 
Requirements (OCR) set by SSM through Supervisory Review and Evaluation Process 
(SREP).  It should be noted that this decrease in RCR, is due to the adoption of IFRS 9. 
 
Table 7 Regulatory Capital Ratio 
Period Piraeus Alpha Eurobank NBG
2016 Q1 17.30% 16.40% 16.90% 17.20%
2016 Q2 17.30% 16.70% 17.10% 16.80%
2016 Q3 17.40% 16.90% 17.70% 16.90%
2016 Q4 16.96% 17.10% 17.90% 16.30%
2017 Q1 16.76% 17.20% 17.50% 16.00%
2017 Q2 16.70% 18.00% 17.60% 16.60%
2017 Q3 16.80% 17.90% 17.40% 16.80%
2017 Q4 15.44% 18.40% 18.00% 17.00%
2018 Q1 14.43% 18.40% 17.40% 16.60%
2018 Q2 13.60% 18.50% 17.40% 16.30%
2018 Q3 13.70% 18.30% 17.10% 16.50%
Regulatory Capital Ratio
 
Source: Based on data from the banks’ financial reports 
 
Profitability 
As depicted in the table below NIM has decrease significantly for PB and moderately 
for the other three banks.  The adoption of IFRS 9, had also an impact on NIM due to 
the increase of provisions as well as asset deleveraging and reduction in loan yields.  
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On the other hand, the reduction of ELA funding, a costly funding mechanism, affected 
positively the NIM.  
 
Table 8 Net Interest Margin 
Period Piraeus Alpha Eurobank NBG
2016 Q1 2.81% 2.80% 2.15% 2.80%
2016 Q2 2.89% 2.80% 2.19% 2.85%
2016 Q3 2.92% 2.90% 2.18% 2.93%
2016 Q4 2.68% 2.90% 2.25% 2.83%
2017 Q1 2.70% 3.00% 2.31% 3.04%
2017 Q2 2.71% 3.10% 2.40% 3.06%
2017 Q3 2.73% 3.10% 2.38% 3.07%
2017 Q4 2.80% 3.10% 2.41% 3.07%
2018 Q1 2.33% 3.00% 2.51% 2.87%
2018 Q2 2.46% 3.00% 2.50% 2.70%
2018 Q3 2.43% 2.90% 2.49% 2.73%
Net Interest Margin
 
Source: Based on data from the banks’ financial reports 
 
 
Efficiency 
To evaluate the efficiency of the four Greek banks we are going to examine the cost-
to-income ratio (C:I).  From the table 9 below, we can observe that Eurobank has the 
lowest ratio while NBG has the highest ratio.  Especially for NBG we can observe that 
there is a significant increase since Q1 2018.  This deterioration can be attributed not 
only in the decrease of operating income but also in the increase of operating 
expenses due to the voluntary exit schemes (VES) that banks incorporated in order to 
achieve a reduction of employees.    
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Table 9 Cost-to-Income 
Period Piraeus Alpha Eurobank NBG
2016 Q1 54.00% 47.80% 49.20% 57.00%
2016 Q2 53.00% 48.20% 49.20% 56.00%
2016 Q3 52.00% 48.40% 48.30% 57.00%
2016 Q4 56.00% 48.20% 48.10% 57.00%
2017 Q1 53.00% 46.30% 48.80% 51.00%
2017 Q2 51.00% 46.20% 49.50% 50.00%
2017 Q3 51.00% 46.60% 48.10% 51.00%
2017 Q4 53.00% 47.60% 47.50% 53.00%
2018 Q1 56.00% 49.90% 48.50% 61.00%
2018 Q2 55.00% 49.50% 47.80% 73.09%
2018 Q3 54.00% 50.70% 47.20% 72.68%
Cost-to-Income
 
Source: Based on data from the banks’ financial reports 
 
Liquidity 
With respect to the banks’ liquidity, we can state that there is a moderate 
improvement since Q1 2016.  This is due to the increase of deposits as a consequence 
of the gradual improvement of the Greek economy and the easing of capital controls 
that the Greek government imposed in 2015.  In addition, the introduction of the 
Deposit Guarantee Scheme (DGS) helped to strengthen the confidence in the banking 
system, which played a pivotal role in the increase of the deposits.   
 
Table 10 Loans-to-Deposits Ratio 
Period Piraeus Alpha Eurobank NBG
2016 Q1 128.00% 148.00% 125.11% 92.00%
2016 Q2 123.00% 143.67% 119.93% 91.00%
2016 Q3 121.00% 140.35% 117.23% 89.00%
2016 Q4 113.00% 134.79% 114.77% 88.00%
2017 Q1 116.00% 133.51% 115.10% 88.00%
2017 Q2 113.00% 128.00% 113.81% 86.00%
2017 Q3 109.00% 128.52% 112.02% 83.00%
2017 Q4 97.00% 120.00% 109.65% 80.00%
2018 Q1 102.00% 115.67% 102.37% 76.00%
2018 Q2 98.00% 111.19% 99.50% 74.00%
2018 Q3 102.00% 105.62% 95.64% 72.00%
Loans-to-Deposits
 
Source: Based on data from the banks’ financial reports 
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7.3 IFRS 9 impact on Greek Banks 
In this section, we examine the four Greek systemic Banks.  This part will cover the up 
to nowadays expected impact of this new accounting standard on the assessment of 
loan impairments, equity and consequently capital requirements of these four Greek 
Banks.   
 
The implementation of IFRS 9 for the Greek Banks was mandatory from January 1st 
2018.  This was due to the provisions of Regulation (EU) No 2017/2395, which amends 
Capital Requirements Regulation (EU) No 575/2013, which all banks adopted.  
According to the above Regulation, “as regards transitional arrangements for 
mitigating the impact of the introduction of IFRS 9 on own funds and for the large 
exposures treatment of certain public sector exposures denominated in the domestic 
currency of any Member State”1.  Based on this amendment banks can mitigate the 
negative impact of IFRS 9 on their CET-1 capital due to the increase in ECL provisions, 
by adding back to their CET-1 capital portion of this increase in ECL provisions (phase-
in approach).  This will be applicable for the first five years of the IFRS 9 adoption while 
the proportion that banks are allowed to add back in 2018 amounts to 95% which will 
gradually be reduced to 25% by 2022.   
 
IFRS 9 has introduced the ECL approach, an approach that will lead to an increase in 
loan loss provisions and consequently affect a bank’s capital adequacy (Plata et al., 
2017; Ntaikou, Vousinas, 2018).  Table 11 shows the needs for additional loan loss 
provisions per product category for the four systemic Greek banks.  Apart from NBG, 
we can observe that the increase in LLP refers to business loans with Piraeus Bank to 
require the most (€1bn) and NBG the least (€0.3).  Overall, the higher need for 
additional LLP has Piraeus Bank with €1.6bn while the other three, Alpha Bank, NBG 
and Eurobank have needs equal to €1bn, €1bn and €1.1 respectively.  
 
 
                                                 
1 This Regulation was published in the Official Journal of the European Union  
 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32017R2395&from=EN 
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Table 11 Additional Loan Loss Provisions  per category 
 
Source: Based on data from the banks’ financial reports 
 
Regarding capital requirements, Table 12 displays the estimations of the four systemic 
Greek banks after the adoption of IFRS 9.  There is a clear indication that the adoption 
of the new accounting standard will reduce significantly capital requirements.  
Specifically, Alpha Bank will be affected the less with a decrease in CET-1 ration (fully 
loaded) by 2.4% while Piraeus Bank is the most vulnerable with a decrease in CET-1 
ratio (fully loaded) by 3%.  In addition, Piraeus Bank has also a need to increase Loan 
Loss Reserves by €1.6bn which is equal to 60%.  Furthermore, even though the bank 
(PB) has the highest volume of NPEs (€32.5bn), it has the highest provision coverage in 
respect with its loans portfolio, 28.2% (Table 12).    
   
Table 12 IFRS 9 impact on Greek Banks 
 
Source: Based on data from the banks’ financial reports 
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Concerning the ECL approach of the new standard, we can observe that stage 2 & 3 
present the most significant change in loan loss provision compared to IAS 39.  As 
there is an increase in credit risk, the transition from stage 1 (12-month ECL) to stage 2 
(lifetime ECL) will consequently lead to an increase in LLP.  From the above table, we 
can notice that in stage 2, the greater IFRS 9 coverage has Piraeus Bank with 11.7% and 
Eurobank with 10.7%.  Stage 3 has the greatest coverage with NBG reaching 57.1% and 
NPEs €18.4bn.  Following NBG, we have Eurobank with coverage 50.5% and NPEs 
€20.1bn while Piraeus Bank has the greatest amount of NPEs (€31.5bn) has better 
coverage (50.2%) than the previous mentioned banks.  Finally, it should be mentioned 
that Alpha Bank even though has larger exposure (€29bn NPEs) than NBG and 
Eurobank, has better coverage (46.6%).   
      
Table 13 ECL approach for Greek banks 
 
Source: Based on data from the banks’ financial reports 
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8. Conclusion 
The present study focuses on the management of NPLs (generally NPEs), in the 
European Banking sector.  In the first part we present the most relevant and 
representative empirical research that has been conducted worldwide with an 
emphasis on Europe.  The majority of the empirical research ascertain that the 
improvement of the banks’ asset quality will have positive impact on the economy 
(Lamandini, 2017).  Therefore, the need to identify the factors that influence this issue 
is imperative in order to find solutions that will mitigate these risks.  One problem that 
was identified by supervisory authorities was the adoption of different practices and 
definitions in its member states.  Each European country applied different terminology 
to define the problem of NPLs, which consequently led to different practices.  EBA in 
order to achieve harmonisation in all European countries, issued in 2014 common 
technical reporting standards.  The following step was the issuance by ECB through 
SSM, guidelines for best practices in the treatment of NPEs.  These guidelines provide 
banks with the necessary tools to help them reduce their troubled assets and thus 
start again to finance projects that will help economic growth.   
 
All the above-mentioned steps are classified in the ex-post measures that supervisory 
authorities have undertaken.  However, these kind of measures were not enough and 
therefore the need for measures that will prevent such problems to rise again, was 
imperative to be implemented.  As a result, the G20 and IASB, issued a new accounting 
standard (IFRS 9) that introduced a forward model of expected credit losses depending 
on the credit deterioration of loans portfolios (ex-ante measure).  Therefore, banks will 
have to identify early possible deterioration of loans and report it through an increase 
in LLP.   
 
Taking into account all these measures, we attempt to assess the Greek banking 
system regarding the management of NPLs.  The four systemic Greek banks are 
assessed in order to determine the efficacy of the methods applied to mitigate the risk 
derived from the increase of NPLs.  Through the examination of not only the banks’ 
financial data but also of other available information (corporate announcements, 
  -48- 
news, investment analysis etc.), we can observe that even though there was a 
significant effort to reduce the volume of NPLs, the banks however were not able to 
achieve the goals set by EU and ECB.  As there is a strong pressure from these 
authorities to succeed in the NPLs reduction, Greek banks have already started  
implementing measures such as sales of troubled assets while nowadays are working 
on the securitisation of loan portfolios (transfer to an SPV and issuance of a bond 
according to BoG proposal).  In the last couple of months, banks also consider the 
transfer of all problem loans to a single AMC not only to improve their balance sheets 
but also to better manage these assets (creation of a single “bad” bank).  However, as 
the Greek banking system is strongly correlated with the Greek economy, it is prudent 
to state that in order to be a significant improvement in the NPL front, the economy 
must overcome the obstacles that is facing and return to a pace of growth.  Regarding 
the adoption of IFRS 9, the Greek banks were affected by this new accounting standard 
which led to an increase in LLP and consequently a decrease in capital adequacy.       
  
Finally, it should be mentioned that the methodology applied in this study could be 
improved by applying econometric methods to compare the Greek banks with other 
countries that have faced or still facing the issue of NPLs.   
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Appendix 
Figure 2 Ratio of NPLs to total assets 
 
 
Figure 3 Impact of NPLs on the economy 
 
Source: European Commission 
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Figure 4 Classification of NPEs 
 Non-performing
past due more than 90 days and / or unlikely 
to pay
Defaulted
Impaired
All other non-defaulted and non-impaired loans and debt 
securities and off-balance sheet exposures meeting the generic 
criteria
Fair value option
Fair value through other comprehensive 
income
Amortised cost
Generic criteria:
off-balance sheet items:
Loan commitments given
Financial guarantees given (except derivatives)
Other commitments given
Performing
Fully perfoming
Loans and debt securities that are not past-due and 
without risk of non-repayment and performing off-balance 
sheet items
Performing assets past due below 90 days
Loans and debt securities between 1-30 days 
past due
Loans and debt securities between 31-60 days 
past due
Loans and debt securities between 61-90 days 
past due
Performing assets that have been renegotiated
Loans and debt securities which renegotiation or refinancing did 
not qualify as forbearance
Forbearance
Forborne loans and debt 
securities (and eligible off-balance 
sheet commitments)
performing or non-performing
Refinancing Modifications of 
terms and 
conditions
Other
 
 Source: European Banking Authority, 2014 
 
 
 
Figure 5 Forbearance measures 
 
Source: ECB 2017  
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Figure 6 Simplified standard structure of a cash securitisation 
 
Source: Caselli & Gatti 2017 
 
 
 
 
Figure 7 Structure of a non-performing loans securitisation 
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Figure 8 NPLs Greece-Italy-Ireland-Spain-Germany-Europe 
 
Source: The World Bank 
 
 
 
Figure 9 NPLs Greece vs Europe 
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Figure 10 GDP – Greece vs European Union 
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Figure 11 Unemployment – Greece vs European Union 
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